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This study examines whether and how labor unionization influences stock price crash risk. Using 
a regression discontinuity design that employs union elections as an exogenous shock yielding 
local variation in unionization, we find that unionization leads to a significant decline in stock 
price crash risk. We further explore the underlying mechanisms through which unionization affects 
crash risk and find that labor unions constrain managerial resource diversion and overinvestment, 
demand less risk-taking, and facilitate transparent information flow, which in turn reduces crash 
risk. Overall, our results suggest that unions play an important governance role. Our study sheds 
new light on a formerly under-researched beneficial impact of unionization and the role that 
organized labor plays in influencing extreme downside risk in the equity market.   
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1. Introduction 
Although union membership is declining, labor unions still play a critical role in various 
corporate activities (e.g., Francia 2012; Kerrissey and Schofer 2013; Chen, Kacperczyk, Ortiz-
Molina 2011). Today, unions represent more than eight million workers at the private sector in the 
United States, and 33 out of the largest 100 industrial firms have unionized employees (Campello, 
Gao, Qiu, and Zhang 2018). It is well-known that unions protect their members’ interests through 
collective bargaining (e.g., Freeman 1980; Lewis 1986). However, little is known about their 
influence on downside risk at the firm level, particularly extreme negative tail risk in the equity 
market or simply stock price crash risk. To fill this void, our study aims to provide systematic 
evidence on whether and how unions influence a firm’s stock price crash risk.  
It is interesting and important to investigate the impact of unionization on stock price crash 
risk for multiple reasons. First, as an extreme, unanticipated outcome, firm-level stock price crash 
has potential to shed light on the true nature of unionization (Taleb 2007; Kim, Li and Zhang 2011a 
and 2011b), which economists have been debating for decades. Second, the effect of unions on 
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crash risk could have implications for policy making, given that “unions in the United States are 
regulated and can be altered by labor laws and regulations over time” (Bradley, Kim, and Tian 
2017, 1). Lastly, stock price crashes bring about a huge loss of investor confidence and thus have 
a serious impact on investor welfare. Unlike the second moment volatility risk, stock price crash 
risk, which is also called the third moment negative skewness risk, cannot be diversified away 
through portfolio diversification strategies by outside investors (Sunder 2010; Kim and Zhang 
2016). It is therefore critical to understand whether and how unionization accelerates or 
ameliorates the likelihood of stock price crash occurrence at the firm level.  
To investigate the effect of unionization on crash risk, we propose and test two competing 
hypotheses based on the predominant views on the economic consequences of unionization. Our 
first hypothesis argues that unionization reduces stock price crash risk for the following reasons. 
First, unions could curb managerial resource diversion and overinvestment because they have a 
voice in corporate governance through threat to invoke a labor strike, stakeholder activism, or 
equity ownership (Agrawal 2012; Faleye, Mehrotra, and Morch 2006; Leung, Li, and Rui 2009; 
Prevost, Rao, and Williams 2012). Second, since organized labor has a fixed claim on firms’ 
resources, they resemble debtholders and prefer less risk taking (Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-
Molina 2011; Chyz, Leung, Li, and Rui 2013). Third, unions may facilitate more transparent 
information flow in that unions can request financial information from management and gather 
additional information during the negotiation (Kleiner and Bouillon 1988). With fewer resource 
diversions, less overinvestment, less risk-taking, and more transparent information flow, stock 
prices are less likely to experience an abrupt, large-scale decline, i.e., stock price crashes (e.g., 
Kim, Li and Zhang 2011a; Hong, Kim and Welker 2017; Chen, Kim, Li, and Liang 2018; Khurana, 
Pereira, and Zhang 2018). We term this view the “governance hypothesis.” 
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An alternative hypothesis predicts that unionization increases stock price crash risk. There 
are at least two reasons for such an increase in crash risk. One reason is that unionization may 
contribute to high opacity since managers at unionized firms have an incentive to preserve high 
information asymmetry with outsiders to keep their bargaining advantage over labor unions (e.g., 
Hilary 2006; Reynolds, Masters, and Moser 1998; Scott 1994). To the extent that opacity facilitates 
bad-news hoarding, unionization is likely to increase stock price crash risk (Hutton, Marcus, and 
Tehranian 2009; Hong, Kim, and Welker 2017). Another reason is that unionization incentivizes 
firms to issue more debt to decrease the funds available for unionized employees and protect 
shareholder wealth from being expropriated by unions (e.g., Bronars and Deere 1991; Matsa 2010). 
More debt increases default risk, which in turn exacerbates stock price crash risk (Zhu 2016). We 
refer to the increase in crash risk arising from one or all of these potential effects of unionization 
as the “threat hypothesis.” 
We test the above two hypotheses by investigating whether unions increase or decrease 
stock price crash risk. However, it is empirically challenging to identify the effect of unionization 
on crash risk. First, there are no large-scale firm-level or establishment-level data on the extent of 
unionization readily available. Second, even if such data are available, it is difficult to identify the 
causal effect of unionization on crash risk due to various endogeneity concerns. Union election 
outcomes could be related to unobservable firm features that influence stock price crash risk at the 
same time (the correlated omitted variable concern). It is also possible that labor forces in firms 
with low crash risk are more likely to win union elections and become unionized than those with 
high crash risk (the reverse causality concern).  
In this article, we collect firm-level union election data from the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB), which allows us to distinguish between firms that elect to be unionized and those 
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that do not. To identify the causal effect of unionization on crash risk, we use a regression 
discontinuity design (RDD). This approach uses a locally exogenous variation in unionization 
produced by “union elections that pass or fail by a small margin of votes” (Bradley, Kim, and Tian 
2017, 2). It compares crash risk of firms that pass elections by a small margin with those that do 
not. The RDD is a powerful strategy in establishing a causal relation between unionization and 
crash risk because, “for these close-call elections, passing is very close to an independent, random 
event and therefore is unlikely to be correlated with unobservable firm characteristics” (Bradley, 
Kim, and Tian 2017, 2). We follow prior research to capture crash risk using two measures: the 
negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns and the ratio of down-week volatility to the up-
week volatility (Chen, Hong and Stein 2001; Hong, Kim and Welker 2017). 
After running multiple diagnostic tests to make sure that the main assumptions underlying 
the RDD are met, we find that unionization reduces stock price crash risk. This result is robust to 
alternative bandwidths and kernels and does not hold when we artificially choose thresholds that 
determine union election results. We further find that the impact of unionization on crash risk is 
significant for firms located in states without right-to-work law, but insignificant for firms in states 
with such a law. This is because unions have a stronger influence in states without right-to-work 
law. We also conduct various cross-sectional analyses to shed light on the underlying mechanisms 
through which unions influence crash risk. We find that the effect of unionization on crash risk is 
stronger among firms with more resource diversion and overinvestment, greater business and 
financial risk-taking, and higher opacity. These results suggest that unions constrain managerial 
resource diversion and overinvestment, demand less risk taking, and facilitate transparent 
information flow, which in turn reduces stock price crash risk.  
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Our study adds to existing literature in the following ways. First, our study expands the 
growing literature on the determinants of stock price crash risk. For example, prior studies show 
that opacity boosts the risk of stock price crashes (Jin and Myers 2006; Hutton, Marcus, and 
Tehranian 2009; Kim and Zhang 2014; and Hong, Kim and Welker 2017), while managers’ 
political ranks in China are inversely associated with crash risk (Chen, Kim, Li, and Liang 2018). 
However, prior research has paid little attention to the role of non-managerial employees in 
influencing crash risk. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to show that non-
managerial employees, particularly unionized employees or organized labor, play a significant role 
in reducing crash risk.  
Moreover, our study differs from prior research on stock price crash risk in that it uses the 
regression discontinuity design (RDD) as an identification strategy. Existing studies on the 
determinants of crash risk focus predominantly on the association between various factors and 
crash risk, which limits the ability of researchers to make causal inferences (Gow, Larker, and 
Reiss 2016).1 Unlike prior studies, our study is one of the few, if not the first, to adopt the RDD 
design which allows us to make a causal inference on the impact of organized labor on crash risk. 
Specifically, our analysis focuses on firms that win or lose union elections by a small margin. As 
such, the union election outcome in our study can be viewed as being random and unpredictable. 
This helps us to establish a causal relation between unionization and crash risk by effectively ruling 
out potential endogeneity associated therewith.  
Second, our study contributes to current debates over the benefits and costs of unionization. 
On the negative side, the literature shows that unions help their members to earn higher wages 
(Freeman and Medoff 1979; Lewis 1986; Jarrell and Stanley 1990); reduce innovations (Bradley, 
                                                          
1 A notable exception is Kim, Lu, and Yu (2018), who use brokerage mergers and closures as an exogenous shock 
leading to analyst coverage drop to examine the causal impact of analyst coverage on ex ante expected crash risk.  
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Kim, and Tian 2017); lead to underinvestment (e.g., Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey 1986; Fallick 
and Hassett 1999; Hirsch 1992), higher cost of equity (Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina 2011), 
lower firm profitability (e.g., Clark 1984; Cable and Machin 1991; Menezes-Filho 1997), lower 
equity value (e.g., Ruback and Zimmerman 1984; Lee and Mas 2012), and higher information 
asymmetry (e.g., Hilary 2006; Scott 1994; Reynolds, Masters, and Moser 1998). On the positive 
side, existing studies document that unions play a governance role (Agrawal 2012; Faleye, 
Mehrotra, and Morch 2006; Leung, Li, and Rui 2009; Prevost, Rao, and Williams 2012) and hence 
constrain tax aggressiveness (Chyz, Leung, Li, and Rui 2013); and demand firms not to undertake 
high-risk projects (Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina 2011; Chyz, Leung, Li, and Rui 2013). 
This study contributes to the debate over the economic consequences of unionization by examining 
the role of labor unions in influencing extreme negative tail risk that is more likely to speak to the 
true nature of unionization (e.g., Taleb 2007). It provides novel and causal evidence on a hitherto 
under-researched beneficial impact of unionization by showing that organized labor contributes to 
lowering stock price crash risk.  
Finally, our study is timely and has implications for policy makers. In his 2015 State of the 
Union Address, the former president Barack Obama told Congress: “We still need laws that 
strengthen rather than weaken unions” (Becker 2015, 65). But recently, some states have 
considered labor laws that significantly weaken the power of organized labor, while some states 
have put such laws in place. For example, in March 2013, the state of Michigan passed right-to-
work laws that ban a labor union’s membership and financial support as prerequisites for 
employment. Indiana also passed similar laws a year earlier. In a widely publicized case, Boeing 
chose to manufacture the new Dreamliner airplane in South Carolina rather than in Washington to 
avoid potential interruptions from union strikes because South Carolina is a state with right-to-
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work laws, while Washington is not (Wall Street Journal 2011). Our findings of a lower crash risk 
after unionization should be of interest to policy makers when they change labor legislation or 
union regulations to increase investor welfare and stabilize the capital market, given that stock 
price crashes are devastating to investor confidence and wealth and capital market stability.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature 
and develops the hypothesis. Section 3 describes the sample, variable measurement, and presents 
the descriptive statistics. In Section 4, we report and discuss the main results. Section 5 examines 
the underlying mechanisms, whereas Section 6 conducts the additional analyses. The final section 
concludes the paper.  
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Labor Unions and Corporate Real Activities 
Existing literature documents that labor unions influence a variety of corporate real 
activities. For example, unions use their collective bargaining power to help their members earn 
higher wages than non-unionized employees (Freeman and Medoff 1979; Lewis 1986; Jarrell and 
Stanley 1990). Due to a concern about unions’ rent seeking, unionized firms hold less cash (Klasa, 
Maxwell, and Ortiz-Molina 2009), take on more debt (Bronars and Deere 1991; Matsa 2010), and 
underinvest in assets (e.g., Connolly et al. 1986; Fallick and Hassett 1999; Hirsch 1992). Since 
unions make wages sticky and layoffs costly and regularly interfere with firms’ restructurings, 
unions reduce firms’ operational flexibility, which in turn raises firms’ systematic risk and hence 
cost of equity (Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina 2011). Unionization is also associated with 
lower firm profitability (e.g., Clark 1984; Cable and Machin 1991; Menezes-Filho 1997) and lower 
equity value (e.g., Ruback and Zimmerman 1984; Lee and Mas 2012). 
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However, unionization does not have an unambiguously adverse effect on a firm’s real 
activities. Labor unions can play a governance role and influence corporate decision making 
through threat to withdraw their contributions to firms via work stoppages or strikes, or through 
stakeholder activism or equity ownership (Agrawal 2012; Faleye, Mehrotra, and Morch 2006; 
Leung, Li, and Rui 2009; Prevost, Rao, and Williams 2012). For instance, unionization is related 
to more vote-no campaigns and shareholder proposals (Ertimur, Ferri, and Muslu 2010). As 
representatives of unionized public employees, state pension funds directed 45% of Disney’s 
shareholders not to vote for Michael Eisner in 2004, which led to his removal as chairman of the 
company’s board of directors (Reilly 2005). The monitoring role of labor unions constrains 
managers’ tax aggressiveness (Chyz, Leung, Li, and Rui 2013). In addition, unions prefer firms to 
undertake less risky investment; organized labor resembles risky debtholders in that they have a 
fixed claim on the firm and are more concerned about downside risk rather than upside potential 
(Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina 2011; Chyz, Leung, Li, and Rui 2013). 
2.2 Labor Unions and Corporate Disclosures 
Unionization can result in an opaque information environment because managers at 
unionized firms have an incentive to keep high information asymmetry with outsiders due to their 
concern that disclosure transparency may undermine their position in collective bargaining (Hilary 
2006). Using a sample of Canadian firms, Scott (1994) finds less voluntary disclosures of an 
important piece of information in union negotiation such as information about pension plans, when 
union strikes are approaching. Reynolds, Masters, and Moser (1998) state that both managers and 
unions attempt to hide or misstate their positions in negotiation process to obtain a stronger 
bargaining power. In a related vein, several studies find that unionized firms engage more in 
downward earnings management to strengthen their bargaining position, when labor negotiations 
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are approaching or after the unionization (e.g., DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1991; Cullinan and 
Knoblett 1994; Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores 1995; D’Souza, Jacob, and Ramesh 2000). Recent 
studies also show that to preserve the information asymmetry between inside managers and 
organized labor, unionized firms prefer private loans to public bonds (Cheng 2017), pay lower 
audit fees and are less likely to hire high-quality auditors such as Big 4 or industry-specialist 
auditors (Cheng, Mitra, Song 2017).  
On the other hand, unionization may facilitate more transparent information flow, leading 
to lower information asymmetry between unions and managers. Kleiner and Bouillon (1988) argue 
that unionized employees may gain privileged access to a significant amount of information about 
the firm even if the firm does not disclose such information. They also point out that unions can 
request financial information from management and gather additional information during 
negotiations. If firms are reluctant to share the information that unions request, unions can petition 
with NLRB or sue (Robbins 1994).  
2.3 Hypothesis Development   
Unionization could affect stock price crash risk via its effect on the real activities and that 
on the information flow. When it comes to the real activities, unionization could constrain 
managerial resource diversion and overinvestment due to its monitoring role. Unions may have a 
voice in corporate governance and influence corporate decision making through threat to withdraw 
the contributions to firms, stakeholder activism, or equity ownership (e.g., Agrawal 2012; Faleye, 
Mehrotra, and Morch 2006; Prevost, Rao, and Williams 2012). Thus, unions have potential to curb 
managerial resource diversion and overinvestment since these activities reduce the resources 
available to unionized employees and even threaten the survival of the firm. With fewer resource 
diversions and overinvestments, stock prices are less likely to crash since these two activities, if 
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unconstrained, could eventually lead to a large-scale abrupt decline in stock prices (Kim, Li and 
Zhang 2011a; Hong, Kim and Welker 2017; Khurana, Pereira and Zhang 2018). 
Unionization can also influence crash risk through its impact on risk taking. Unions prefer 
firms to take fewer risks because similar to creditors, organized labor has a fixed claim on firms’ 
resources in the form of wages and salaries (Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina 2011; Chyz, 
Leung, Li, and Rui 2013). Faleye, Mehrotra, and Morch (2006) document that employee equity 
ownership is related to lower business risk, while Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015) show that 
union density is associated with lower leverage, which reduces financial risk.2 As firms take fewer 
risks, their stock prices are less likely to tumble. Some regulators and academics point out that 
excessive risk taking stemming from stock options leads to the recent financial crisis (e.g., 
Bebchuk 2009). Recently, Chen, Kim, Li, and Liang (2018) find that in China, managers at high 
political ranks are associated with lower crash risk than those at low ranks. This is because the 
former employs fewer risky strategies than the latter to stay employed in China’s closed pyramidal 
managerial labor market where opportunities for alternative employments are limited for managers 
with higher political ranks. 
Additionally, unionization could affect crash risk through its effect on the information 
flow. Employees in a unionized firm may attain a significant amount of information about the firm 
even if the firm does not release such information, and unions can gather additional information 
in the negotiating process (Kleiner and Bouillon 1988). Further, unions may empower employees 
to do whistle-blowing, which constrains managers to hide information or allows the information 
hidden by management released to the public. With more transparent information flow for 
unionized firms, it is less likely that bad news will be concealed, which in turn reduces stock price 
                                                          
2 Union density reflects the degree of labor bargaining centralization and is captured by the ratio of union membership 
divided by employment.  
11 
 
crash risk given that bad-news hoarding leads stock prices to crash (e.g., Jin and Myers 2006; Kim, 
Li and Zhang 2011a, 2011b).  
In short, unionization may reduce stock price crash risk by constraining managerial 
resource diversion and overinvestment, controlling excessive risk-taking, and facilitating 
transparent information flow. We call this view the “governance hypothesis” and state it below in 
alternative form:  
H1a: Unionization leads to a decrease in stock price crash risk, ceteris paribus. 
 Alternatively, unionization may lead to higher crash risk for at least two reasons. First, 
unionization may incentivize managers to preserve information asymmetry with outsiders due to 
the concern that information release weakens their bargaining power (e.g., Hilary 2006; Reynolds, 
Masters, and Moser 1998; Scott 1994). As a result, bad news is more likely to be withheld and 
stockpiled within a firm, which increases the likelihood of stock price crash occurrence at the firm 
level (e.g., Jin and Myers 2006; Kim, Li and Zhang 2011a, 2011b). Second, unionized firms take 
on more debt to decrease the funds available for unionized employees and protect shareholder 
wealth from being expropriated by unions (e.g., Bronars and Deere 1991; Matsa 2010). When 
firms have more debt outstanding, default risk increases, which in turn boosts stock price crash 
risk (Zhu 2016). We denote the rise in crash risk stemming from any one or all of these possible 
impacts of unionization as the “threat hypothesis.” We state it below in alternative form:  
H1b: Unionization leads to an increase in stock price crash risk, ceteris paribus. 
 
3. DATA AND VARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
3.1 Data and Sample 
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We collect data from several sources: union election data from NLRB, weekly stock return 
data from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP), and annual financial data from 
Compustat. The NLRB provides detailed data related to union elections for the period 1977-2015, 
including the number of eligible voters, the number of voters who voted for and against 
unionization, the company name involved in the election, and the time and location of the election, 
among other things.3 But our union data start with 1980 due to the missing values of valid vote 
shares for unionization during 1977-1979. We follow Lee and Mas (2012) to manually match the 
union election data with CSRP using company names and then merge with Compustat, which gives 
us 5,342 elections. Next, we remove observations if election voting outcomes are missing or if less 
than 100 employees participate in the election, resulting in 1,037 elections.4,5 When there are 
multiple elections within a fiscal year, we keep the first election, consistent with Bradley, Kim and 
Tian (2017) and Huang, Jiang, Lie and Que (2017). This procedure leaves us 899 elections.  
We next exclude firms in regulated industries with SIC code from 4900 to 4999 and 
financial institutions with SIC code from 6000 to 6999. We also exclude observations with 
negative total assets or equity value as well as those with missing values for variables used in the 
empirical models and require each fiscal year to have at least 26 weekly returns. This procedure 
yields a final sample of 687 unique union elections spanning the period 1981-2016, among which 
200 elections favor unionization.6  
                                                          
3 We downloaded electronic records of union election data for the period 1977-1999 from Thomas Holmes’s website 
(http://users.econ.umn.edu/~holmes/data/geo_spill/) and for the period 2000-2011 from https://www.data.gov/ and for 
the period 2011-2015 from the NLRB website. 
4 We require union elections to have at least 100 participating employees since union elections with a smaller group 
of participants are less likely to have a significant impact on firm behavior and outcomes. This type of filter is widely 
used in the labor union election literature (e.g., Lee and Mas 2012; Bradley et al. 2017; Huang et al 2017). 
5 In robustness checks, we follow Lee and Mas (2012) to use the fraction of workforce voted in the election to select 
the sample. Specifically, we remove observations if less than 2 percent of workforce voted in the election and find that 
our baseline results (untabulated) hold using this alternative sample. We also rerun the tests after removing 
observations if less than 3 percent (4 percent) of workforce voted and find qualitatively similar results.  
6 Our sample period ends in 2016 because our dependent variable is measured one year ahead of all the independent 
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3.2 Measurement of Firm-specific Crash Risk 
Following prior literature (e.g., Chen, Hong and Stein 2001; Kim, Li and Zhang 2011a, 
2011b), we capture firm-specific crash risk using two alternative measures: the negative skewness 
of firm-specific weekly returns (NCSKEW) and the down-to-up volatility (DUVOL). Specifically, 
we first estimate the following expanded market model to calculate the firm-specific weekly 
returns:  
𝑟𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝜏−2 + 𝛽2𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝜏−1 + 𝛽3𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝜏 + 𝛽4𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝜏+1 + 𝛽5𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝜏+2 + 𝜀𝑗,𝜏                        (1) 
where rj,t is the return on stock j in week τ and rm,t is the return on the CRSP value-weighted market 
return in week τ. The lead and lag terms for market index are included to minimize potential 
problems arising from nonsynchronous trading. The firm-specific weekly return (W) is then 
defined as W = ln (1 + εj,t). 
To construct our first measure of crash risk, NCSKEW, we take the negative of the third 
moment of firm-specific weekly returns for each fiscal year and divide it by the standard deviation 
of firm-specific weekly returns raised to the third power. Specifically, for each firm j in year t, 
NCSKEW is computed as:  
𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑗,𝑡 = −[𝑛(𝑛 − 1)
3
2 ∑𝑊𝑗,𝑡
3 ]/[(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 − 2)(∑𝑊𝑗,𝑡
2 )3/2]                                 (2) 
where n is the number of firm-specific weekly returns during the fiscal year t, and other variables 
are defined as above. Higher values of NCSKEW correspond to higher crash risk.  
To derive our second measure of crash risk, DUVOL, we split all the weekly return 
observations in our sample period into those with firm-specific weekly returns below the annual 
mean (“down” weeks) and those with firm-specific weekly returns above the annual mean (“up” 
                                                          
variables.  
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weeks). We next calculate the standard deviation for each of these subsamples separately. DUVOL 
is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard deviations of the down weeks to that of the up 
weeks defined as below:  
𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑗,𝑡 = log⁡{(𝑛𝑢 − 1)∑ 𝑊𝑗,𝑡
2
𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁 /(𝑛𝑑 − 1)∑ 𝑊𝑗,𝑡
2
𝑈𝑃 }                                               (3) 
where nu (nd) is the number of UP (DOWN) weeks, and all other variables are defined as before. 
Higher values of DUVOL imply that a firm’s stock price is more likely to crash.  
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for union election and stock price crash risk 
variables. The mean value of NCSKEW (DUVOL) is -0.048 (-0.042) and the median value of 
NCSKEW (DUVOL) is -0.098 (-0.061), which are close to those reported by Khurana, Pereira and 
Zhang (2018). The mean (median) value of VOTE is 0.442 (0.400) with a standard deviation of 
0.210, implying that on average 44.2% of votes are in favor of unionization. The mean of 
Unionization is 0.291, implying that the unionization rate is about 29.1%. The statistics of union 
election are comparable to those presented in prior literature (e.g., Bradley, Kim and Tian 2017; 
Huang, Jiang, Lie and Que 2017; He, Tian and Yang 2016; Campello, Gao, Qiu and Zhang 2018).  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
4. RDD AND MAIN RESULTS 
4.1 Empirical Strategy and Diagnostic Tests 
We follow Campello, Gao, Qiu and Zhang (2018) and Bradley, Kim and Tian (2017) to 
estimate the causal impact of unionization on crash risk using a regression discontinuity design 
(RDD). The RDD exploits local variations in the vote share of union elections by comparing crash 
risk between firms with closely won elections and those with closely lost elections. Close-win 
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firms are unionized while close-loss firms are not unionized; yet the two groups are ex ante similar. 
Moreover, given the nature of the voting process, individuals or firms are unlikely to anticipate or 
manipulate close election outcomes (Campello, Gao, Qiu and Zhang 2018). Therefore, one can 
infer the causal effect of unionization on crash risk by contrasting crash risk between close winners 
and losers of union elections.   
Specifically, we implement the RDD using two approaches: the global polynomial 
regression and the local linear regression. The former uses the following model:  
1
1
1
1
( 0.5)
( ) ( 0.5)
p
n
t l t ln t
n
p
n
rn ln t t t
n
CRASH Unionization VOTE
Unionization VOTE
  
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



     
     


                                              (4) 
where CRASH refers to crash risk variables (NCSKEW or DUVOL); Unionization is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if a firm is unionized and zero otherwise; VOTE is the union 
vote share in the election. We follow Lee and Lemieux (2010) to deduct 0.5 from VOTE so that 
Eq. (4) is centered around the vote share threshold 50%. Accordingly, τ identifies the change in 
crash risk variables as the vote share just goes beyond 50% and provides an estimate of the effect 
of unionization on stock price crash risk.  
The global polynomial regression uses all available data and hence provides more precise 
estimates. But this approach could bring in biases in estimates since it imposes a given functional 
form onto the association between vote shares and crash risk over a large range of data. Thus, we 
alternatively use the local linear regression that uses a narrow range of data surrounding the vote 
share cutoff of 50%. This approach has the advantage of reducing biases stemming from the global 
functional form, but it has a lower statistical power owing to the smaller sample size.  
The local linear regression approach is implemented using the following model: 
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                                                                (5) 
where 0.5-h ≤ VOTEt ≤ 0.5+h, and τ identifies the effect of unionization on crash risk. We estimate 
Eq. (5) using triangular and rectangular kernels.  
The application of RDD relies on the satisfaction of two assumptions. One assumption is 
that the forcing variable (the number of vote shares) is not precisely manipulated by agents (voters 
and employers) around the known threshold (Lee and Lemieux 2010), suggesting a continuity of 
the distribution of the forcing variable surrounding the vote share threshold.7 The other assumption 
requires no discontinuity in other covariates that are related to crash risk around the same threshold. 
In other words, it requires firms that win or lose by a very small margin to be not significantly 
different across the other covariates. We next examine whether the two assumptions are satisfied.   
To check the validity of the first assumption, i.e., the continuity of the vote share 
distribution, we follow Bradley, Kim and Tian (2017) to conduct two tests. First, we plot a 
histogram of the distribution of vote shares across 20 equally spaced vote share bins (with a 5.0% 
bin width) in Figure 1. If vote shares within a narrow window of the cutoff are manipulated by 
either voters or employers, we should observe a discontinuity in the vote share distribution at the 
50% cutoff. Figure 1 shows continuous distribution of vote share within the narrow window around 
the cutoff, indicating that there is no precise manipulation at the threshold.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Second, we adopt the method proposed by McCrary (2008) to formally test the continuity 
assumption of the vote share distribution.8 Figure 2 plots the density of union vote shares. It shows 
                                                          
7  Even if the forcing variable is manipulated to some extent, an exogenous discontinuity still permits random 
assignment to the treatment so long as firms do not precisely control the forcing variable (Lee 2008).  
8 See http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~jmccrary/DCdensity/ for more detailed information about this test.  
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that the density of vote shares is smooth and the fitted curve shows little evidence of a strong 
discontinuity around the 50% cutoff. The discontinuity estimate is -0.279 with a standard error of 
0.251. Hence, we are not able to reject the null hypothesis of continuous density at the threshold,  
confirming anew that the vote shares are not precisely manipulated around the known cutoff.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
To check the validity of the second assumption, i.e., the continuity of other covariates, we 
test whether there are significant differences in the covariates of firms that fall in a narrow window 
of vote shares, [48%, 52%] surrounding the 50% cutoff. Following prior research (e.g., Hutton, 
Marcus and Tehranian 2009; Kim, Li, and Zhang 2011a, 2011b; Khurana, Pereira and Zhang 
2018), we include the following variables that have been shown to influence crash risk as the 
covariates: return on assets (ROA), market-to-book ratio (MB), firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), 
de-trended share turnover (DTURN), standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns (SIGMA), 
annual average of firm-specific weekly returns (RET), and the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (ABACC). The appendix provides more details on the definitions of these covariates. 
Table 2 presents the results of this diagnostic test. It shows that all the covariates in the union 
election year are not significantly different between the close-win firms and the close-loss firms.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
In short, the above diagnostic tests suggest that the union vote shares are not likely to be 
precisely manipulated by voters or employers around the 50% cutoff point. Moreover, other 
covariates do not exhibit a discontinuity at the threshold. Therefore, the assumptions of the RDD 
are met and the RDD can be used to identify the causal effect of unionization on crash risk.    
4.2 Main RDD Results 
4.2.1 Graphic Analysis of the Outcome 
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We first use graphical analysis to describe the relation between union vote shares and crash 
risk in the vicinity of the threshold. We split the vote share into 20 equally spaced bins and compute 
the conditional average of the crash risk variables for each bin. We next fit crash risk variables as 
2nd-order polynomial functions of vote shares. Figure 3 shows the graph on the relation between 
the vote share and the crash risk variables. The upper plot presents the negative skewness 
(NCSKEW) and the bottom plot presents the down-to-up volatility (DUVOL). The x axis is the 
forcing variable VOTE, the percentage of votes favoring unionization. The dots represent the mean 
value of crash risk variables (NCSKEW and DUVOL) for each bin. The solid line fits crash risk 
variables as quadratic polynomial functions of vote shares.  
Figure 3 shows that both NCSKEW and DUVOL exhibit a discontinuity around the 50% 
cutoff following the union elections. Within a narrow window of the cutoff point, crash risk drops 
significantly once union vote shares exceed the 50% threshold, suggesting that unionization has a 
negative impact on crash risk.    
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
4.2.2 Global Polynomial Regressions 
We next perform the regression discontinuity analysis using a global polynomial regression 
by estimating Eq. (4) with the polynomial order of two.9 Table 3 presents the results. Columns (1) 
and (2) report the results without control variables and year and industry fixed effects.10 Regardless 
of measures for crash risk, the coefficients on Unionization are negative and statistically significant 
at the 5% level. These results indicate that unionization has a negative influence on stock price 
                                                          
9 We initially estimate Eq. (4) using the polynomial order of one, two, three, and four, respectively. We report the 
results using the polynomial order of two because the Akaike information criteria (AIC) is the smallest when using 
this polynomial order and Lee and Lemieux (2010) suggest to select the polynomial order based on AIC. Though not 
tabulated, we find that the results using the polynomial order of two are the strongest.   
10 Specifically, we use Fama-French-12 industry fixed effects. As a sensitivity analysis, we repeat all the analyses 
using alternative industry fixed effects as identified by two-digit SIC, Fama-French 17 industries, and Fama-French 
48 industries. Our results are qualitatively similar.  
19 
 
crash risk. In terms of the economic magnitude, crash risk is 30.9% (22.7%) lower for unionized 
firms than for firms losing union elections, in a year after union election, when NCSKEW 
(DUVOL) is used to capture crash risk. Given that the standard deviation of NCSKEW (DUVOL) 
is 0.702 (0.476), a 30.9% (22.7%) reduction represents 0.440 (0.477) standard deviation reduction 
of NCSKEW (DUVOL) after unionization for an average firm in the sample, which is economically 
significant. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
In Columns (3) and (4), we include year and industry fixed effects. The coefficients on 
Unionization are still significantly negative at the 5% level whether NCSKEW or DUVOL is used 
as the measure for crash risk, again consistent with H1a. To further check the robustness of our 
results, in Columns (5) and (6), we control for several variables that prior research finds to 
influence crash risk, although the covariates are not needed for the RDD (Lee and Lemieux 2010). 
The coefficients on Unionization remain significantly negative regardless of the measures for crash 
risk, providing additional support for H1a. 
4.2.3 Local Linear Regressions 
Although the global polynomial regressions have the advantage of providing more precise 
estimates due to the use of all union election data, it is essential to use local linear regressions 
because the RDD has strong local validity (Bakke and Whited 2012) and local linear estimates 
have rate optimality and superior bias features (Fan and Gijbeles, 1992; Hahn, Todd and Van der 
Klaauw 2001). Thus, we alternatively use local linear regressions in the vicinity of the 50% cutoff. 
Specifically, we employ both triangular and rectangular kernels to estimate Eq. (5) with the 
bandwidth defined as the optimal bandwidth based on Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Table 4 
reports the results.  
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The coefficients on Unionization are significantly negative across both Columns (1) and 
(2) when triangular kernels are used, in line with the results from global polynomial regressions in 
Table 3. The magnitudes of the coefficients are also similar to those presented in Table 3. They 
show that crash risk is 30.1% (26.6%) lower for unionized firms than for firms losing union 
elections when NCSKEW (DUVOL) is used to capture crash risk. Given that the standard deviation 
of NCSKEW (DUVOL) is 0.702 (0.476), a 30.1% (26.6%) reduction represents 0.429 (0.559) 
standard deviation reduction of NCSKEW (DUVOL) after unionization for an average firm in the 
sample, which is economically significant.11 Columns (3) and (4) use rectangular kernels and 
report similar results (a drop of 26.0% and 27.8% for NCSKEW and DUVOL, respectively). In 
short, the results in Section 4.2 suggest unionization leads to a decrease in stock price crash risk, 
supporting the governance hypothesis.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.3 Robustness Checks 
In this subsection, we conduct multiple sensitivity analyses to check the robustness of our 
RDD results. First, we check whether our results from local linear regressions are sensitive to the 
choice of alternative bandwidths. As pointed out by Lee and Lemieux (2010), selecting a 
bandwidth requires a trade-off between bias and precision. When a wider bandwidth is employed, 
more observations are included and hence the estimates are more precise, but this approach could 
bring about bias in the estimates since the linear estimation may not fit the data correctly. The 
                                                          
11 Note that the relatively large economic magnitude could arise for two reasons. First, given that we require union 
elections to have at least 100 participating employees, we may have kept a sample of firms with more powerful unions, 
which should have bigger influence on corporate activities and hence crash risk. Second, we use observations within 
a narrow window of vote shares around the cutoff 50%, in which the contrast between unionized firms and non-
unionized firms may be more distinct. As the window around the cutoff becomes expanded, the coefficient magnitude 
goes down significantly as shown in Panel A of Table 5.  
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opposite is true when a narrower bandwidth is selected. Thus, we test the robustness of our RDD 
results using alternative bandwidths.  
Panel A of Table 5 reports the results of estimating Eq. (5) using triangular kernels with 
alternative bandwidths.12 The alternative bandwidths we employ include: 25%, 50%, 1.5 times, 
and 2.0 times of the optimal bandwidth defined by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Across all 
these alternative bandwidths, the coefficients on Unionization are consistently negative and 
significant regardless of crash risk measures used. These findings indicate that our baseline RDD 
results using local linear regressions are robust to the use of alternative bandwidths.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Second, we use triangular kernels to estimate Eq. (5) after including the control variables 
in Table 3. As shown in Panel B of Table 5, the coefficients on Unionization remain negative and 
significant with their magnitude being similar to those reported in Table 4, irrespective of whether 
NCSKEW or DUVOL is used to proxy for crash risk, suggesting that our results are not sensitive 
to whether we control for the covariates or not.  
Next, we perform several placebo tests to examine whether unionization still has a similar 
effect on crash risk if we artificially select a cutoff other than the true cutoff 50%. Panel C of Table 
5 reports the results of the placebo tests using triangular kernels. It shows that across all the 
artificially-chosen thresholds, 25%, 45%, 55%, and 75%, the coefficients on Unionization are 
insignificantly different from zero. The evidence suggests that our baseline RDD results are 
unlikely to be driven by chance.  
                                                          
12 We use triangular kernels in all the robustness checks reported in Table 5 because the statistics literature has 
documented that “a triangular kernel is optimal for estimating local linear regressions at the boundary, because it puts 
more weight on observations closer to the cutoff point” (Bradely et al. 2017, 11). Nevertheless, we repeat all the 
analyses in Table 5 using rectangular kernels and find our results generally hold (untabulated for brevity). 
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Finally, we test whether our baseline results still hold when using alternative measures of 
crash risk. Following Hutton, Marcus and Tehranian (2009) and Jin and Myers (2006), we 
alternatively use two other measures for crash risk: Crash and Down. Crash is an indicator variable 
that equals one if there is at least one crash week during which the firm experiences firm-specific 
weekly return 3.09 standard deviation below the mean of firm-specific weekly returns during a 
fiscal year and zero otherwise. Down is the number of the crash weeks that a firm experiences over 
the fiscal year. Panel D of Table 5 reports the results of estimating Eq. (5) using these alternative 
measures of crash risk. As shown in Panel D, we find that crash risk is 14.6% (15.7%) lower for 
unionized firms than for firms losing union elections when Crash (Down) is used to capture crash 
risk. The finding suggests that our RDD results are robust to using alternative measures of crash 
risk. 
 
5. UNDERLYING MECHANISMS 
We document pervasive evidence supporting the governance hypothesis. To better 
understand how unionization reduces crash risk, we now investigate the possible mechanisms 
through which unionization affects crash risk. Specifically, we explore four mechanisms: resource 
diversion, overinvestment, risk-taking, and opacity.  
5.1 Resource Diversion 
We first explore whether a decrease in managerial resource diversion after unionization is 
a possible mechanism through which unionization lowers crash risk. As discussed in Section 2, 
unions could constrain managerial resource diversion due to their monitoring role, which could in 
turn lower the likelihood of stock price crashes. The reason is that resource diversion could cause 
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stock prices to tumble once the related information is released (Kim, Li and Zhang 2011a; 
Khurana, Pereira and Zhang 2018).  
To test this mechanism, we examine whether the effect of unionization on crash risk is 
stronger among firms with more resource diversion than among firms with less resource diversion. 
Similar to Atwood and Lewellen (2015), Khurana, Pereira and Zhang (2018), and Louis and Urcan 
(2015), we capture resource diversion using two alternative measures: shareholder payout (Payout) 
and free cash flow (Free_CF). We use these two measures for the following reason: existing 
literature shows that inside managers have incentives to keep cash, rather than pay it out to 
shareholders, so that they can use firm resources for their personal benefits or investment in pet 
projects (DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner 2009; Harford, Mansi and Maxwell 2008). We then 
partition the sample based on the sample median of these variables in year t and examine the impact 
of unionization on crash risk in year t+1 separately for the two subsamples: (i) high versus low 
payout; and (ii) high versus low free cash flow.13  We run the local linear regressions using 
triangular kernels with the optimal bandwidth defined following Imbens and Kalyanaraman 
(2012). Table 6 presents the RDD results.   
As shown in Panel A, we find that regardless of crash risk measures used, the coefficient 
on Unionization is negative and significant at 5% level for the subsample of firms with low payout 
(and thus high likelihood of resource diversion), but not for the subsample with high payout. Panel 
B shows that for both measures of crash risk, the coefficient on Unionization is negative and 
significant at 5% level for the subsample of firms with high free cash flow, but not for the 
                                                          
13 Note that Unionization and all partitioning variables are measured in year t. Despite this, partitioning variables 
should largely reflect the values before unionization because union elections, on average, occur in the middle of the 
year in our sample and the effect of union may not kick in immediately after election. Nevertheless, given that unions 
should have bigger effect for firms with more resource diversion (high overinvestment, more risk-taking, high opacity) 
before unionization, we alternatively use resource diversion in year t-1 (before unionization), rerun the cross-sectional 
analysis, and find largely similar results (untabulated for brevity).  
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subsample with low free cash flow. In short, these results suggest that unionization has a large, 
significant effect on crash risk for firms that are more prone to engage in resource diversion, but 
only a small, insignificant effect on crash risk for firms that are less prone to resource diversion. 
These results buttress and enrich the view that a shrinkage in resource diversion following 
unionization is one underlying mechanism through which unionization lowers crash risk.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
5.2 Overinvestment  
A decline in overinvestment following unionization can be another mechanism through 
which unionization reduces crash risk. Given that unions have a voice in corporate governance, 
they could curb overinvestment, resulting in lower crash risk. The rationale is that if 
overinvestment continues for too long, it will create bubbles in the asset market, which in turn 
increases the likelihood of asset price crashes (Bleck and Liu 2007; Benmelech, Kandel and 
Veronesi 2010).  
To test this mechanism, we examine whether the impact of unionization on crash risk is 
more pronounced for firms with high overinvestment than for firms with low overinvestment. We 
follow Richardson (2006) and Blaylock (2016) to measure overinvestment using the amount of 
unexpected investment (OVERINVEST) captured by the residual estimate from an investment 
expectation model. Appendix provides more details on the variable definition. We first partition 
the full sample based on the sample median of this variable and examine the impact of unionization 
on crash risk separately for the subsamples with high versus low unexpected investment. Panel A 
of Table 7 presents the RDD estimates for each subsample. It shows a negative and significant 
coefficient on Unionization, regardless of crash risk measures, for the subsample with high 
unexpected investment, but not for the subsample with low unexpected investment.  
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To further check the robustness of the above results, we keep the subsample with positive 
values of unexpected investment, i.e., OVERINVEST, and then partition this subsample based on 
the median OVERINVEST. Panel B of Table 7 similarly shows a significantly negative coefficient 
on Unionization, irrespective of crash risk measures used, for the subsample of firms with high 
unexpected investment, but not for the subsample with low unexpected investment. The results 
reported in Table 7, taken together, indicate that unionization has a significantly negative effect on 
crash risk for firms with high overinvestment, but a negligible effect on crash risk for firms with 
low overinvestment. This evidence is in line with the view that a reduction in overinvestment after 
unionization is one plausible mechanism through which unionization mitigates the likelihood that 
firms experience stock price crashes in the future.   
[Insert Table 7 here] 
5.3 Risk-taking  
The third mechanism we explore is risk-taking. Just like creditors, unionized employees 
care more about downside risk than upside potentials and prefer firms to take fewer risks since 
they have a fixed claim on firms’ resources (Chen, Kacperczyk and Ortiz-Molina 2011; Chyz, 
Leung, Li and Rui 2013). With fewer risk-taking, stock prices of unionized firms are less likely to 
plunge.  
To test this mechanism, we examine whether the effect of unionization on crash risk is 
stronger for firms with more risk-taking. We identify two dimensions of risk-taking, business risk-
taking and financial risk-taking. We capture business risk-taking using the standard deviation of 
return on assets (ROA_STD) and financial risk-taking using leverage (LEV). We then partition the 
sample based on the sample median of theses variables and examine the impact of unionization on 
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crash risk separately for the following subsamples: (i) high versus low ROA volatility; and (ii) high 
versus low leverage. Table 8 presents the RDD estimates for each subsample.  
As shown in Panel A, we find that no matter how we measure crash risk, the coefficient on 
Unionization is negative and significant for the subsample of firms with high ROA volatility, but 
not for the subsample with low ROA volatility. Panel B shows that for both measures of crash risk, 
the coefficient on Unionization is negative and significant for the subsample of firms with high 
leverage, but not for the subsample with low leverage. In short, these results suggest that 
unionization has a significant impact on crash risk for firms with more risk-taking, but not for 
firms with less risk-taking, confirming that a decrease in risk-taking after unionization is an 
underlying mechanism through which unionization lowers crash risk. 
[Insert Table 8 here]  
5.4 Opacity 
We also explore whether more transparent information flow following unionization is 
another mechanism through which unionization diminishes crash risk. As mentioned in Section 2, 
unions facilitate more transparent information flow because they can gather additional information 
in the negotiating process and unionized employees gain access to more information about the firm 
even if the firm does not disclose such information (Kleiner and Bouilllon 1988). As a result, 
unionized firms are less likely to withhold bad news inside the firms and accumulate it over time, 
which in turn lowers crash risk given that bad-news hoarding contributes to stock price crashes 
(e.g., Jin and Myers 2006; Kim, Li and Zhang2011a, 2011b).   
To test this mechanism, we examine whether the effect of unionization on crash risk is 
stronger for more opaque firms. We use two alternative measures of opacity: total accruals (TA) 
and the number of analysts following a firm (Analyst_COV). We next partition the sample based 
27 
 
on the sample median of these variables and estimate our RDD regressions separately for the 
following subsamples: (i) high versus low total accruals; and (ii) high versus low analyst coverage. 
Table 9 presents the RDD estimates for each subsample. 
Panel A shows that no matter how we measure crash risk, the coefficient on Unionization 
is negative and significant for the subsample of firms with high total accruals, but not for the 
subsample with low total accruals. Panel B shows that regardless of crash risk measures used, the 
coefficient on Unionization is significantly negative for the subsample of firms with low analyst 
coverage, but not for the subsample with high analyst coverage. In short, these results suggest that 
unionization has a significant impact on crash risk for  opaque firms (with high total accruals and 
low analyst coverage), but not for transparent firms, supporting that transparent information flow 
after unionization is one economic mechanism through which unionization lowers crash risk. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
6. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
6.1 Right-to-Work Legislation 
Our results thus far suggest that unions have a voice in corporate governance and hence 
they can constrain managerial resource diversion, curb overinvestment, request fewer risk-taking, 
and facilitate transparent information flow, which in turn reduces crash risk. An important 
assumption underlying our analysis is that unions have considerable bargaining power. To further 
support our story, we investigate whether the impact of unionization on crash risk varies with 
unions’ bargaining power by taking advantage of right-to-work laws. Unions have weaker 
bargaining power in states that have passed right-to-work laws than in states without such laws 
because unions in the former states cannot set union membership and dues as prerequisites for 
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employment (e.g., Bradley, Kim and Tian 2017; Campello, Gao, Qiu and Zhang 2018). As a result, 
unions in such states with right-to-work legislations are expected to have lower bargaining power, 
and thus have a weaker impact on crash risk than those in in states without such legislation. We 
test this prediction using the local linear regressions.  
Table 10 presents the RDD results. In states with right-to-work laws, the coefficient on 
Unionization is insignificantly different from zero. In contrast, the coefficient on Unionization is 
significantly negative in states without right-to-work laws. In short, the effect of unionization on 
crash risk is weaker in such states that have adopted right-to-work laws due to unions’ undermined 
bargaining power, irrespective of crash risk measures used. These results lend further support to 
our governance hypothesis.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
6.2 Subsample Analyses Based on Performance 
To further corroborate the governance hypothesis, we examine whether the impact of 
unionization on crash risk varies with firm performance. Given unions’ concern for members’ job 
security, wages, and benefits, unions should be more active in corporate governance when firm 
performance is poor. Hence, we expect the impact of unionization on crash risk is more 
pronounced among firms with poor (or low) performance than among firms with good (or high) 
performance. To test this conjecture, we partition the sample based on the sample median of ROA 
and examine the impact of unionization on crash risk separately for the subsamples with good 
versus poor performance using local linear regressions.  
Table 11 presents the RDD estimates. Across both measures of crash risk, the coefficient 
on Unionization is highly significant and negative for the subsample of firms with poor 
performance, but insignificantly different from zero for the subsample with good performance. 
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This finding implies that unionization significantly reduces crash risk for firms with poor 
performance, but has a negligible effect on crash risk for firms with good performance, which is 
again in line with the governance hypothesis.  
[Insert Table 11 here] 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
We examine the effect of unionization on stock price crash risk. Using a regression 
discontinuity design as an identification strategy, we find that stock price crash risk decreases 
significantly following unionization. We perform a battery of sensitivity analyses and find that our 
results still hold. We also show that the impact of unionization on crash risk is significant for firms 
in states without right-to-work legislation, but insignificant for firms in states with such a 
legislation due to unions’ weaker bargaining power in these states. Our various cross-sectional 
analyses show that the effect of unionization on crash risk is stronger among firms with more 
resource diversion and overinvestment, greater business and financial risk-taking, and higher 
opacity. These results suggest that a reduction in managerial resource diversion, overinvestment, 
and risk-taking, and an increase in transparency are the underlying mechanisms through which 
unionization lowers crash risk.  
Overall, our study sheds new light on a formerly under-researched beneficial impact of 
unionization. It also highlights the important role that organized labor plays in influencing crash 
risk, which has been largely ignored in the literature. Our results of a lower crash risk following 
unionization should be of interest to policy makers when they change labor legislation or union 
regulations to increase investor welfare and stabilize the capital market since stock price crashes 
are destructive to investor confidence, shareholder wealth, and capital market stability. 
30 
 
Finally, we acknowledge the limitations of the RDD and alert readers to be cautious when 
generalizing our inferences in different contexts. The RDD exploits the local variation in 
unionization generated by union elections and compares crash risk between the two distinct 
samples of firms with the close-win and close-loss elections. Thus, it can have strong local validity, 
but weak external validity. In other words, the negative impact of unionization on crash risk may 
be only applicable to firms with vote shares falling in the close vicinity of the threshold. It should 
be noted, however, that in the presence of heterogeneous treatment effect, the RDD estimate can 
be interpreted as a weighted average treatment effect across all individuals, where the weights are 
proportional to the ex ante likelihood that the realized assignment variable will be near the 
threshold (Lee and Lemieux 2010). We therefore reiterate the point that “it remains the case that 
the treatment effect estimated using a RD design is averaged over a larger population than one 
would have anticipated from a purely ‘cutoff’ interpretation” (Lee and Lemieux 2010, 298). 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Dependent variables 
NCSKEW The negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns over the 
fiscal year. The firm-specific weekly return is equal to ln 
(1+residual), in which the residual is estimated using the expanded 
market model below:  
𝑟𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝜏−2 + 𝛽2𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝜏−1 + 𝛽3𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝜏 + 𝛽4𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝜏+1 ⁡⁡
+ 𝛽5𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝜏+2 + 𝜀𝑗,𝜏 
DUVOL The log of the ratio of the standard deviations of firm-specific 
weekly returns for down weeks (weeks with firm-specific weekly 
returns below the annual mean) to the standard deviation for the up 
weeks (weeks with firm-specific weekly returns above the annual 
mean) 
Crash An indicator variable that equals one for a firm-year that experience 
one or more firm-specific weekly returns falling 3.09 standard 
deviation below the mean firm-specific weekly return over the fiscal 
year, and zero otherwise 
Down The number of crash weeks during the fiscal year. Crash weeks are 
defines as those weeks during which the firm experiences firm-
specific weekly return 3.09 standard deviation below the mean of 
firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year.  
 
Testing variables 
Unionization An indicator variable that equals one if a firm is unionized as a result 
of a labor union election and zero otherwise 
VOTE The total number of votes for unionization divided by the total 
number of eligible employees in a given union election. 
 
Control variables 
ROA The income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total 
assets 
MB The market value of equity divided by the book value of equity 
SIZE The log of the market value of equity 
LEV The total long-term debt divided by total assets 
DTURN The average monthly share turnover over the current fiscal year 
period minus the average monthly share turnover over the previous 
fiscal year period, where monthly share turnover is computed as the 
monthly trading volume divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding during the month 
SIGMA The standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over the 
fiscal year period 
RET The mean of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year period, 
times 100 
ABACC The absolute value of discretionary accruals, where discretionary 
accruals are residuals obtained by estimating the modified Jones 
(1991) model in the cross-section by each industry (SIC 2-digit) 
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year. Modified Jones (1991) model used is the following: TA/Assets 
= λ (1/Assets) + β1(∆SALES - ∆AR) / Assets + β2(PPE/Assets), 
where TA is total accruals, ΔSALES is change in sales revenue, ΔAR 
is the change in accounts receivable, PPE is gross property and 
equipment. 
 
Partitioning variables 
TA Total accruals, defined as income before extraordinary items (IB) 
minus operating cash flow (OANCF after 1988 or IB-
∆ACT+∆CHE+∆LCT-∆DLC+DP before 1988).  
Analyst_COV The number of analysts that covered the firm 
OVERINVEST The residual estimated from the following model: 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+𝛼3𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑡
+∑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +∑𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜖𝑡+1 
where MB, ROA, LEV are defined above. CASH is cash and cash 
equivalents divided by lagged total assets. AGE is the natural log of 
firm age plus one, where firm age is calculated as the current fiscal 
year minus the first year when a firm appears on COMPUSTAT. 
LOGASSETS is the natural log of total assets. INVEST is the sum of 
capital expenditures, research and development expense, and 
acquisitions less proceeds from sale of fixed assets and depreciation, 
divided by lagged total assets.  
Payout Total cash dividends paid divided by lagged total assets 
Free_CF Cash flow from operation minus cash dividends, scaled by lagged 
total assets 
ROA_STD The standard deviation of ROA for the past three years 
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Figure 1: Distribution of votes 
 
 
Notes. This figure plots a histogram of the distribution of the number of elections with 
the percentage of votes for unionizing in our sample across 20 equally spaced bins (with 
a 5.0% bin width). Union election results are from the NLRB over 1980-2015.  
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Figure 2: Density of union vote shares 
 
 
Notes. This figure plots the density of union vote shares following the procedure in 
McCrary (2008). The x axis is the percentage of votes favoring unionization. The dots 
depict the density estimate. The solid line represents the fitted density function of the 
forcing variable (the number of vote shares) with a 95% confidence interval around the 
fitted line. Union election results are from the NLRB over 1980-2015.  
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Figure 3: Regression discontinuity plots 
 
 
 
Notes. This figure presents regression discontinuity plots using a fitted quadratic 
polynomial estimate with 95% confidence intervals. The x axis is the percentage of 
votes favoring unionization and the dots depict the average crash risk variables in each 
of 20 equally spaced bins (with a 5.0% bin width). Union election results are from the 
NLRB over 1980-2015. Crash risk variables (NCSKEW and DUVOL) are calculated 
from CRSP over 1981-2016. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 N MEAN SD P25 P50 P75 
Crash risk statistics       
NCSKEW 687 -0.048 0.702 -0.439 -0.098 0.334 
DUVOL 687 -0.042 0.476 -0.376 -0.061 0.259 
 
Union election statistics 
Unionization 687 0.291 0.455 0.000 0.000 1.000 
VOTE 687 0.442 0.210 0.303 0.400 0.536 
Notes. This table reports the descriptive statistics of our sample. The sample period is 
from 1981 through 2016. All variables are defined in Appendix.  
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Table 2: Difference in the observable characteristics between unionized and non-
unionized firms 
 Unionization=0 Unionization=1 Difference p-value 
ROA 0.054 0.055 -0.001 0.920 
MB 2.019 1.853 0.166 0.662 
SIZE 7.010 6.398 0.612 0.477 
LEV 0.193 0.234 -0.041 0.404 
DTURN 0.089 0.018 0.071 0.507 
SIGMA 0.053 0.038 0.015 0.140 
RET -0.215 -0.089 -0.126 0.191 
ABACC 0.052 0.049 0.003 0.853 
Notes. This table presents the differences in observable characteristics between firms 
that win union elections versus those that lose by a small margin (vote shares within 
the interval of [48%, 52%]). The sample period is from 1981 through 2016. All 
variables are defined in Appendix.  
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Table 3: Regression discontinuity - Global polynomial 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NCSKEW DUVOL NCSKEW DUVOL NCSKEW DUVOL 
Unionization -0.309** -0.227** -0.305** -0.242** -0.283* -0.221** 
 (-2.121) (-2.311) (-2.052) (-2.395) (-1.914) (-2.197) 
DVOTE 1.125 1.096 0.513 0.848 0.278 0.680 
 (1.056) (1.522) (0.468) (1.138) (0.253) (0.907) 
DVOTE2 2.974 3.035 1.258 2.300 0.668 1.889 
 (1.089) (1.643) (0.449) (1.207) (0.238) (0.987) 
Unionization*DVOTE 0.919 0.140 1.608 0.562 1.668 0.610 
 (0.545) (0.123) (0.935) (0.480) (0.971) (0.521) 
Unionization*DVOTE2 -6.627* -5.278** -5.092 -4.832* -3.995 -4.144 
 (-1.804) (-2.125) (-1.359) (-1.897) (-1.069) (-1.629) 
SIZE     0.0343* 0.0237* 
     (1.839) (1.866) 
LEV     0.255 -0.0158 
     (1.118) (-0.102) 
MB     0.0204 0.00746 
     (1.092) (0.587) 
ROA     1.303** 0.635* 
     (2.533) (1.816) 
DTURN     0.0368 0.0689 
     (0.443) (1.217) 
RET     -0.0309 -0.148 
     (-0.0579) (-0.408) 
SIGMA     1.811 -0.408 
     (0.418) (-0.138) 
ABACC     -0.157 -0.186 
     (-0.198) (-0.345) 
ABACC2     -1.577 -0.714 
     (-0.901) (-0.599) 
Constant 0.0502 0.0464 0.180 0.104 -0.281 -0.0880 
 (0.552) (0.755) (1.294) (1.098) (-1.123) (-0.516) 
Polynomial 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 687 687 687 687 687 687 
Notes. This table shows the RDD results from estimating a polynomial model specified 
in Equation (4). DVOTE is defined as VOTE minus 0.5. The sample period is from 1981 
through 2016. All variables are defined in Appendix. *, **, and *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 4: Regression discontinuity - Nonparametric local linear regression 
 Triangular Rectangular 
    (1)    (2)     (3)    (4) 
NCSKEW DUVOL NCSKEW DUVOL 
Unionization -0.301** -0.266*** -0.260** -0.278** 
 (-2.422) (-2.856) (-2.137) (-2.321) 
Notes. This table presents local linear regression results using the optimal bandwidth 
following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Results using triangular and rectangular 
kernels are both reported. The sample period is from 1981 through 2016. All variables 
are defined in Appendix. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 5: Robustness tests 
Panel A: Alternative bandwidths 
 (1) (2) 
 NCSKEW DUVOL 
Unionization (Optimal bandwidth*0.25) -0.661** -0.502** 
 (-2.517) (-1.968) 
Unionization (Optimal bandwidth*0.5) -0.388** -0.371** 
 (-2.249) (-2.278) 
Unionization (Optimal bandwidth*1.5) -0.207* -0.239*** 
 (-1.938) (-3.099) 
Unionization (Optimal bandwidth*2.0) -0.170* -0.176** 
 (-1.723) (-2.263) 
 
Panel B: Including control variables 
  
 (1) (2) 
NCSKEW DUVOL 
Unionization -0.288** -0.249** 
 (-2.232) (-2.248) 
Control variables Yes Yes 
 
Panel C: Placebo tests  
  
 (1) (2) 
NCSKEW DUVOL 
Unionization (cutoff=25%) -0.013 -0.058 
 (-0.058) (-0.310) 
Unionization (cutoff=45%) -0.151 -0.109 
 (-0.925) (-0.896) 
Unionization (cutoff=55%) 0.066 0.110 
 (0.400) (0.786) 
Unionization (cutoff=75%) -0.572 -0.405 
 (-1.260) (-0.982) 
 
Panel D: Alternative measures of crash risk 
 (1) (2) 
Crash Down 
Unionization -0.146** -0.157** 
 (-2.307) (-2.092) 
Notes. This table reports the robustness tests using the local linear regressions. Results 
using triangular kernels are reported. Panel A reports the results with the alternative 
bandwidths. Panel B reports the results including control variables. Panel C reports the 
placebo tests that artificially assume alternative thresholds other than 50%. Panel D 
reports the results using alternative measures of crash risk. The sample period is from 
1981 through 2016. All variables are defined in Appendix. *, **, and *** represent 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 6: Subsample analyses based on resource diversion 
Panel A: Payout (Payout) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
NCSKEW DUVOL NCSKEW DUVOL 
 High Low 
Unionization -0.041 -0.100 -0.712** -0.444** 
 (-0.208) (-0.568) (-2.491) (-2.461) 
 
Panel B: Free cash flow (Free_CF) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
NCSKEW DUVOL NCSKEW DUVOL 
 High Low 
Unionization -0.0.574** -0.377** -0.108 -0.182 
 (-2.25) (-2.183) (-0.495) (-1.263) 
Notes. This table presents local linear regression results of subsample analyses based 
on resource diversion using the optimal bandwidth following Imbens and 
Kalyanaraman (2012). Results using triangular kernels are reported. Panel A reports the 
results partitioned by the sample median of payout (Payout), while Panel B reports the 
results partitioned by the sample median of free cash flow (Free_CF). The sample 
period is from 1981 through 2016. All variables are defined in Appendix. *, **, and 
*** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: Subsample analyses based on overinvestment (OVERINVEST) 
Panel A: Partitioning the full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
NCSKEW DUVOL NCSKEW DUVOL 
 High Low 
Unionization -0.518** -0.307* -0.264 -0.246 
 (-2.395) (-1.900) (-0.854) (-1.389) 
 
Panel B: Partitioning the subsample with positive OVERINVEST 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
NCSKEW DUVOL NCSKEW DUVOL 
 High Low 
Unionization -0.997** -0.423** -0.288 -0.225 
 (-2.555) (-2.019) (-0.912) (-0.817) 
Notes. This table presents local linear regression results of subsample analyses based 
on overinvestment using the optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman 
(2012). Results using triangular kernels are reported. Panel A uses the full sample and 
partitions it by the sample median of OVERINVEST, while Panel B uses the subsample 
with positive OVERINVEST and partitions it by the sample median of OVERINVEST. 
The sample period is from 1981 through 2016. All variables are defined in Appendix. 
*, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 8: Subsample analyses based on risk-taking 
Panel A: ROA volatility (ROA_STD) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
NCSKEW DUVOL NCSKEW DUVOL 
 High Low 
Unionization -0.705* -0.573*** -0.352 -0.176 
 (-1.962) (-3.052) (-1.444) (-1.044) 
 
Panel B: Leverage (LEV) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
NCSKEW DUVOL NCSKEW DUVOL 
 High Low 
Unionization -1.328*** -0.903*** 0.024 0.052 
 (-3.540) (-4.333) (0.126) (0.300) 
Notes. This table presents local linear regression results of subsample analyses based 
on risk-taking using the optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman 
(2012). Results using triangular kernels are reported. Panel A reports the results 
partitioned by the sample median of ROA volatility (ROA_STD), while Panel B reports 
the results partitioned by the sample median of leverage (LEV). The sample period is 
from 1981 through 2016. All variables are defined in Appendix. *, **, and *** 
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9: Subsample analyses based on opacity 
Panel A: Total accruals (TA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
NCSKEW DUVOL NCSKEW DUVOL 
 High Low 
Unionization -0.639** -0.364** -0.141 -0.188 
 (-2.556) (-2.449) (-0.633) (-1.031) 
 
Panel B: Analyst coverage (Analyst_COV) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
NCSKEW DUVOL NCSKEW DUVOL 
 High Low 
Unionization -0.148 0.035 -0.510* -0.396** 
 (-0.668) (0.206) (-1.730) (-2.311) 
Notes. This table presents local linear regression results of subsample analyses based 
on opacity using the optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). 
Results using triangular kernels are reported. Panel A reports the results for firms with 
high total accruals versus those with low total accruals, while Panel B reports the results 
for firms with high analyst coverage versus those with low analyst coverage. The 
sample period is from 1981 through 2016. All variables are defined in Appendix. *, **, 
and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10: Right-to-work laws 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
NCSKEW DUVOL NCSKEW DUVOL 
 With right-to-work laws Without right-to-work laws 
Unionization -0.404 -0.149 -0.412* -0.410** 
 (-1.179) (-0.771) (-1.720) (-2.382) 
Notes. This table presents local linear regression results using the optimal bandwidth 
following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) for firms located in the states with right-
to-work laws versus the states without right-to-work laws. Results using triangular 
kernels are reported. The sample period is from 1981 through 2016. All variables are 
defined in Appendix. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 11: Subsample analyses based on performance (ROA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
NCSKEW DUVOL NCSKEW DUVOL 
 High Low 
Unionization -0.353 -0.148 -0.548** -0.502*** 
 (-1.421) (-0.801) (-2.356) (-2.943) 
Notes. This table presents local linear regression results of subsample analyses based 
on performance using the optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman 
(2012). Results using triangular kernels are reported. The sample period is from 1981 
through 2016. All variables are defined in Appendix. *, **, and *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
